Ⅰ. Introduction
Government plays a significant role as a purchaser of health care. Regardless of the level of government involvement in health care, ensuring equal access to health services for the entire population is arguably among the most important functions of government. Of particular interest is the provision of health care benefits to individuals with limited financial resources. They are often subsidized to use health services under a limited cost-sharing requirement or free of charge. However, as health expenditures continue to rise in almost all countries, it has become increasingly difficult for those countries to continue to provide free or near-free coverage to financially-needy families and individuals.
Cost sharing and gatekeeping represent typical methods that countries increasingly use to control unnecessary utilization and health care expenditures. In the UK and the Scandinavian countries, patients usually need a referral from their general practitioners to receive secondary care such as hospital or specialty services. Most recently, France implemented the Preferred Doctor scheme-a variant of gatekeeping aiming to control outpatient specialty care costs-in January 2006 after a long contentious debate since the early 1990s (Dourgnon & Naiditch, 2010) . In the US, a strong gatekeeping role of primary care providers is found in some health maintenance organizations. Despite recent doubt about gatekeeping arrangements as an effective cost-constraint instrument (Blumenthal, 2001; Forrest, 2003; Pati et al., 2003; Dourgnon & Naiditch, 2010) , several U.S. studies suggest that gatekeeping may prevent inappropriate utilization of secondary health services and reduces health spending (Martin et al., 1989; Leibowitz et al., 1985; Ferris et al., 2001) . Among European countries, as compared to countries with a gatekeeping system in place, those without it appear to spend a greater portion of their national GDP on health care (Anderson et al., 2000) .
Imposing copayments and deductibles can result in a greater financial burden for the patient, especially if patients do not change their utilization of health services.
For low-income individual, patient cost sharing may adversely affect affordability, and possibly lead to harmful health consequences due to delayed or forgone health care (Ku, 2003; Ku et al., 2004) . Nevertheless, a wealth of the literature shows that a user-charge arrangement reduces excess demand for health care services (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000; Zweifel, 2000; Baicker & Goldman, 2011) . A recent comparative analysis of data from France, Germany and Spain concludes that patient cost sharing leads to reduced physician visits, but its effect on hospital use is inconclusive (Lostao et al., 2007) . The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) shows that patient cost sharing reduces health service utilization in the experimental setting among non-elderly individuals (Newhouse & Group, 1993; Manning et al., 1987) . This well-accepted conclusion was recently replicated in a Belgian study that provides consistent findings comparable in magnitude in a real world setting ( Van de Voorde et al., 2001 ). Further, a recent analysis of retired employees enrolled in the California Public Employees Retirement System finds that the effect of patient cost sharing on physician visits for the elderly is comparable to that of the Rand HIE for non-elderly individuals (Chandra et al., 2010) . Findings from both experimental and non-experimental settings also consistently find an inverse relationship between cost sharing and prescription drug usage (Newhouse & Group, 1993; Manning et al., 1987; Chandra et al., 2010; Skipper, 2013; Winkelmann, 2004) .
Gatekeeping and patient cost sharing are often used in combination. For example, in Norway and Portugal, general practitioners act as gatekeepers to specialized, costly care, and patients pay copayments for consulting general practitioners (Ros et al., 2000) . The effects of gatekeeping and cost sharing have been independent subjects of extensive investigation. However, the extent to which a blend of these two strategies could lead to a reduction in health expenditures and utilization in a non-experimental setting is not well understood. A recent policy change in South Korea presents a unique situation that allows for the study of both cost-sharing and gatekeeping.
In July 2007, the Korean government introduced a major policy change to the Medical Aid (Class 1) Program for people with low income to control its rapidly increasing health expenditures. The Medical Aid reform has two major components, the introduction of patient cost sharing and the use of designated health providers.
The former aims to promote enrollees' personal responsibility to reduce excessive utilization and costs of health care while the latter intends to enhance the gatekeeping mechanism of health care delivery through which a designated physician serves as the only entry point into the health care system. These changes present an interesting policy experiment that other countries can look to for guidance when searching for ways to reduce health care expenditures. Surprisingly, only a few studies investigated the impacts of this important policy change. Roh & Yoon (2008) Class1 patients, and reported a decreased outpatient and medication days. Yang(2009) analyzed person-level administrative data, and reported a 0.004% reduction in outpatient days per episode during the 1½ follow-up period. Only one study examined and did not find difference in healthcare utilization between Class1 patients who designated healthcare providers and those who did not (Lim 2010) .
Although research by Roh & Yoon (2008) , Yang (2009) and Lim (2010) offer some evidence that the South Korean Medical Aid reform (i.e., concurrent introduction of patient cost sharing and gatekeeping) might lead to cost reductions, causal inference is limited. The short follow-up period, the lack of control for confounding factors (e.g., changes in sociodemographic compositions of beneficiaries), and the nonexperimental research design limits the ability to fully evaluate the cost and utilization impact of the policy change. To our knowledge, only Roh & Yoon (2008) directly tested the effect of the Medical Aid reform on the program's health expenditures.
No study has examined mechanisms by which the reform may reduce health spending.
In this study, we test whether, and to what extent, the Medical Aid reform in (Mathauer et al. 2009 ).
Since its start in 1977, Medical Aid has provided medical assistance to the nations' most vulnerable families in poverty. Medical Aid is a means-tested program for which eligibility is determined based on income and property (Lee, 2013 (Mathauer et al., 2009 ).
Of particular interest among policy makers was the overuse of outpatient services for minor ailments. Per-enrollee outpatient visits in South Korea were roughly 12 in 2005, which were greater than in most OECD countries (Mathauer et al., 2009 (Shin, 2007) . The increase rates were approximately twice as high as those for NHI enrollees (Shin, 2007 (Shin, 2007) . There was no change to inpatient utilization.
In order to provide some financial protection to beneficiaries, the cost sharing amount differs by the level of care. According to the 2007 cost-sharing schedule for outpatient visits, Class 1 patients must pay small flat amounts of 0.87-1.3 USD (or 1,000-1,500 Won) at clinics and 1.3-2.2 USD (1,500-2,500 Won) at secondary and tertiary hospitals. In addition, patients now must pay up to 0.78 USD (900 Won)
per pharmacy visit. The copayments account for 3 to 6% of outpatient costs and approximately 1% of medication spending among all Medical Aid patients in 2010.
Those who are less than 18 years of age, pregnant or nursing, or who have a rare and incurable disease (approximately 19 percent of Class 1 beneficiaries), are exempt from the cost sharing requirement (Mathauer et al., 2009 ). See Mathauer et al. (2009) for complete details on the cost-sharing policy.
Second, is exemption of cost sharing for patients who designate primary health care providers (or gatekeepers). This is to enhance rationality in health care provision and reduce duplication of care. Class 1 patients can be exempt from cost sharing by using primary care physicians they choose as designated health providers when the number of outpatient visits reaches a ceiling. Designated health providers would then monitor and steer primary health care needs of their patients, and serve as 
Ⅲ. Methods
We analyze and pre-post difference in the outcomes for the reference group (i.e., Class 2 program).
The approach-that is, a difference-in-differences model-is appropriate for this study because we can define straightforwardly the subgroups of Medical Aid beneficiaries who were affected by the reform and those who were not. Our empirical work minimizes bias in difference-in-differences estimates due to demand and supply-side confounders, both observed and unobserved, discussed below. The frequency of health care use (i.e., outpatient visits, hospital days, and pharmacy visits) was greater for the Class 1 program. Also, Class 1 beneficiaries spent more per visit than Class 2 beneficiaries when they make outpatient and pharmacy visits.
Data sources and variables
However, spending per hospital day was greater among Class 2 patients who spent average $52(60 thousandWon) per quarter during the study period.
The key independent variable is Reform, which equals 1 if a quarter falls within the post-reform period and only if an observation is for Class 1 program, and zero otherwise. There are 18 and 14 quarterly counts of observations per region respectively for the pre and post-reform period.
As shown below, our analytic model controls for potential confounders that summarize both demand and supply-side changes that could affect health expenditure.
Demand-side variables capture changes in demographic and major disease profiles including age compositions (with 0-20 age category serving as the reference), the percent of female beneficiaries, and the percent of beneficiaries with cancers, disabilities, chronic diseases, and mental disorders. As compared to Class 2 program, Class 1 had greater percentages of senior enrollee over 60, female, and those with cancers, disability, chronic illness, and mental illness. Supply-side factors include per-capita income, and per-capita tertiary hospitals, secondary hospitals, primary hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, doctors, and pharmacists.
Pre and post-reform comparison shows that health care utilization and spending in general increased after the reform for both Class 1 and Class 2 enrollees. As shown below, the general trend is directly specified in our empirical model, which otherwise may lead to biased estimates of the reform. The demand-side and supply-side characteristics differ by Medical Aid type and before and after the reform to varying degrees. This supports need of an empirical model controlling for enrollee heterogeneity, both unobserved and unobserved, to minimize bias in an estimated effect of the reform. 
Econometric model
We estimate an empirical model of the following functional form to isolate the effect of the Medical Aid reform:
where subscripts i, c and t respectively represent a region, Medical Aid category The difference-in-differences model assumes that the pre-post outcome difference in the control group (i.e., Class 2) serves as a reasonable proxy for the pre-post outcome difference in the policy group (i.e., Class 1). Therefore, an estimated effect of the reform would be biased if the reform influenced the policy and control groups heterogeneously. Our empirical model minimizes this potential limitation as followings.
We include in the empirical model demand and supply-side determinants of Medical Aid expenditure-  and  , respectively-to control for observed differences between Class 1 and Class 2 enrollees.
Unobserved factors are also specified in the empirical model. refers to region fixed-effects, and control for unobserved, consistent regional differences that may explain the outcomes. The model includes , quarterly time fixed-effects, to control for unspecified quarter-time-specific shocks that affect the outcomes and do not vary across regions. Therefore, our approach represents a more rigorous variant to a typical difference-in-differences model, in which binary indicators for policy group and post-reform period are included to control for unobserved group and time differences.
Further, we remove additional sources of bias by including 1/4 to 4/4-quarter dummy variables (qtr) that capture seasonable variations in expenditures. Including time trends specific to each region minimizes concern that a pre-post change in an outcome may not be attributed to the Medical Aid reform due to different time trends experienced by Class 1 and Class 2 enrollees. Therefore, to remove bias from all unobserved regional factors that linearly or non-linearly affect health spending and utilization over time, we tested region-specific time trends in spending (  ×  ), where t is a time trend from 1 st quarter to 32 nd quarter. After preliminary checks, we include linear trends.
Estimation
We initially tested whether our data violate essential assumptions underlying the analysis of time-series cross-section (TSCS) data. We performed tests for panel heteroskedasticity (e.g., less populous regions have greater error variance), contemporaneous correlation (e.g., the errors are correlated across regions), and autocorrelation (e.g., the errors are time-dependent for a region). We calculated likelihood ratios, a procedure suggested by Wiggins & Poi (2003) , as a test for panel heteroskedasticity, computed the Breusch-Pagan statistic as a test for contemporaneous correlation (Green, 2000) , and implemented Wooldridge's test for autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2002) . Rejecting null hypotheses suggest deviation from independent errors in the context of TSCS data. As shown in Table   2 , all the error violations were detected in our data, suggesting that if standard errors are not corrected properly, statistical inference drawn from the data would be jeopardized (Wooldridge, 2002) .
We compute panel-corrected standard errors to make correct statistical inference under panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous error correlation (Beck & Katz, 1995 . We follow Plümper et al. (2005) and carry out the Prais-Winsten transformation to adjust standard errors for a first-order autoregressive process. As we will show below, our main results are robust to different estimation techniques. we find no statistically significant change in per-enrollee spending on hospitalization and medication although the coefficients are negative. Incontrast, we find no statistically significant change in per-enrollee spending on hospitalization and medication although the coefficients are negative.
Ⅳ. Results

Effect of the Medical Aid reform on per-enrollee spending
We briefly discuss coefficient estimates of the covariates. A greater representation of beneficiaries aged 20-40 is statistically significantly associated with lower medication spending while the relative size of persons aged 40-60 is significantly and positively associated with medication spending. The proportion of elderly beneficiaries aged 60 or older is negatively and significantly relates to hospitalization and medication costs. As shown in Table 1 , the proportion of enrollees aged 20-40
and 60-or-older somewhat decreased over the study period while there were increases in per-enrollee spending. Taken together, the identified association appears to capture the inverse trends between the age categories and per-enrollee spending. Table 4 presents results from the mechanism models. The reform is significantly associated with reductions in outpatient visits per enrollee. Although negative coefficients are found for hospital and pharmacy use days, there is no statistically significant change before and after the reform. We preserve a discussion on the covariates because they have implications similar to those reported in Table 3 .
Mechanisms: frequency of service use and per-visit spending
We find no significant change in per-visit outpatient and hospitalization spending.
However, per-visit medication spending was greater for the post-reform period.
Robustness analysis
The robustness of our main findings is assessed in several ways. We explore potential over-specification of our empirical model by omitting the region-time interaction variables (i.e., region-specific time trends). As shown in the first row of Table 5 , the coefficients on the reform variable is consistent with the main estimates from Tables 3 and 4 , for per-enrollee outpatient spending and visits. However, significant coefficients are now found for hospital spending and hospital days. Also, the statistical significance for per-visit medication spending reported in Table 4 now disappears. To summarize, only results on the outpatient outcomes remain unaltered.
We re-estimate the empirical model of the same functional form using different estimation techniques. We employ the Beck-Katz approach to autocorrelation that includes a once-lagged outcome variable in the right-hand side of the empirical equation (Beck & Katz, 1995 . As a reminder, we used the Prais-Winsten transformation (Plumper et al., 2005) to obtain the main coefficient estimates. Our main results for per-enrollee outpatient spending and per-enrollee visits and per-visit medication spending have the same interpretation. However, as with the prior robustness check, we find statistically significant negative coefficients for hospital spending and hospital days.
We test whether the main findings are sensitive to a function form of the dependent variable. Dependent variables in original metrics are regressed on the same independent variables. We find that the reform is significantly and negatively associated with per-enrollee outpatient spending, outpatient visits, and pharmacy visits, and is positively associated with per-enrollee hospital spending and per-visit medication spending. 
Ⅴ. Discussion
This study tested whether a change to the Medical Aid Class 1 Program in South Korea that concurrently implemented patient cost sharing and gatekeeping led to reductions in Medical Aid health care spending. Findings show that during the 3 1/2-year follow-up period, the Medical Aid reform led to significant reductions in per-enrollee outpatient spending. On average a 15.6% reductions in outpatient spending per quarter appear to be attributable to the reform. Given that patient cost sharing amounts to 3-6% of outpatient costs in 2010, this finding suggests that even a small copayment, in combination with a gatekeeping arrangement, could lead to large savings on outpatient services in a government-funded health care assistance programs.
Robust evidence was not found that the reform led to reductions in per-enrollee hospitalization costs. In addition, we consistently show statistically insignificant coefficients for per-enrollee medication spending, which may not be very surprising when we consider that the copayment for pharmaceuticals approximately corresponds to only 1% of medication expenses in 2010. This finding supports the importance of proper levels of user fees for the purpose of cost containment.
In terms of the mechanisms, our results show a statistically significant decrease in per-enrollee outpatient visits after the reform, implying that the decrease in outpatient spending is likely due to the reduced use of outpatient providers. As with the result on per-enrollee hospitalization spending, findings for frequencies of hospitalization and pharmacy visits are not insensitive in relation to empirical model specification, different estimation method, and the metric of the outcome variables.
In addition, statistically insignificant associations are found for per-visit spending on outpatient and hospital use while results on per-visit medication costs are not robust. Therefore, we do not believe that providers changed their behaviors in such a way to reap greater reimbursement per visit. The findings also imply that cost sharing and gatekeeping combined do not always distort provider decisions even under reduced patient visits and also under the fee-for-service reimbursement scheme.
Given the structure of the data, we were not able to isolate the independent effect of cost sharing and gatekeeping. As noted earlier, there is some skepticism about the ability of gatekeeping arrangements as a cost-constraint instrument (Blumenthal, 2001; Forrest, 2003; Pati et al., 2003; Dourgnon & Naiditch, 2010) . For example, primary care physicians or general practitioners who play a gatekeeping role make more referrals than non-gatekeepers in the US as well as in Europe (Forrest et al,. 1999; Gervas et al., 1994) . In the US, there is no difference in specialty referral practice between physicians who act as gatekeepers to secondary care and those who do not (Forrest et al., 1999; Forrest et al., 2003) . In 1995, organizational structure such as the gatekeeping system was not associated with any cost savings among US medical group practice clinics that provided services for a Blue Cross managed care program (Kralewski et al., 2000) . On the other hand, cost sharing proves to be an effective cost-containment tool (Zweifel, 2000; Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000; Van de Voorde et al., 2001 ). In addition, Lim (2010) did not find any statistically significant difference in health care utilization between Medical Aid Class 1 beneficiaries with designated health care providers and beneficiaries without those providers. Taken together, the current literature implies that patient cost sharing might dominate the joint effect reported here.
This study does not speak to changes in patient outcomes after the reform, which we did not intend to test. The potentially adverse health impact of patient cost sharing, especially for low-income individuals, is well reported (Ku, 2003; Ku et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2005) . This should be an important agenda for future research.
Medical Aid is currently in the process of improving the gatekeeping (or case management) mechanism. Future researchers will be able to incorporate this additional policy element into the empirical model and assess whether the magnitude of change still lies with patient-cost sharing.
Ⅵ. Conclusion
In a government-funded health care program such as Medical Aid in South Korea, excess use of health care services for petty episodes and resulting costs could place limits on ensuring sustainable assistance for high-cost cases and severely-ill patients and also on expanding coverage. This study provides robust evidence that even a small copayment policy (in combination with a gatekeeping arrangement) could lead to significant health care cost savings. However, we could not conclude whether the reduction in health spending was achieved because Medical Aid enrollees became more prudent in using health services after the cost-sharing and gatekeeping reform or because patients now had to delay or forgo necessary health services due to increased financial burden. Future research can benefit from investigating whether, and to what extent, the policy change in South Korea has influenced health outcomes especially among those who reduced health care utilization following the reform. 
